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Abstract
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes
banks comparative advantage in monitoring nancial distress in order to
explain rmschoice between bank loans and market debt. Banks can deal
with nancial distress more cheaply than bond holders, but this requires a
higher initial expenditure proportional to the loan size. In contrast, bond
issues may involve a small xed cost. Entrepreneurschoice of bank or bond
nancing depends on their net worth. The steady state of the model can
explain why smaller rms tend to use more bank nancing and why bank
nancing is more prevalent in Europe than in the US. We nd that a higher
xed cost of issuing market debt is a key factor in replicating the higher use
of bank nancing relative to market debt in Europe. Finally, we nd that for
plausible calibrations one can predict aggregate quantities just as well using
a model with only one type of loan with costs of nancial distress that are
an average of the costs for bank loans and market debt.
JEL classication: E4, G3
Key words: nancial frictions, costly state verication, nancial distress
.
0I would like to thank Francisco Ruge-Murcia, Onur Ozgur, Rui Castro, Pierre Olivier
Weill and Thomas Lubik for their comments. I am also grateful to participants at the
CIREQ Macro Lunch, the SCSE 2008 annual conference at Montebello and the CEA 2008
annual conference in Vancouver for their suggestions and comments.
0bd.solomon@umontreal.ca
1
1 Introduction
Debt nancing is the most prevalent form of external nancing in most devel-
oped countries(see for example Damodaran[10] and Gorton and Winton[19]).
One of the most important characteristics of debt is whether it is issued by
a bank(or a similar institution such as a nance company) or whether it is
market debt. There is a vast theoretical litterature discussing the di¤erence
between these two types on debt(Diamond[11] and Rajan[29] are seminal
contributions), emphasizing the trade o¤between the better loan monitoring
or information gathering abilities of banks and the extra costs attached to
borrowing from a bank. Because the level of nancial frictions attached to
the two types of loans is di¤erent, the composition of nancing between them
may matter for the overall level of nancial frictions a¤ecting rms and for
macroeconomic outcomes. To complicate matters, the choice between bank
and market debt almost certainly depends on aggregate macroeconomic con-
ditions.
Most dynamic general equilibrium models with nancial frictions ignore
the distinction between bank loans and market debt[6][2]. Models that ex-
amine the e¤ect of frictions between banks and their depositors assume that
banks are responsible for all lending in the economy[24][8]. This assump-
tion leads to a potential overestimate of the impact of bank lending on the
transmission of shocks, since it eliminates the possibility of using other types
of nancing. Market debt accounts for 57:5% of total non nancial sector
debt in the US and for 12% of non nancial sector debt in the Euro area[14].
Clearly assuming 100% bank or bond lending may be misleading in analyzing
nancial frictions in the US. For the Euro area such an assumption may seem
like a good approximation, except that it is still possible that the low average
proportion of bond nancing hides important variation across the business
cycle which may be relevant for the propagation of various shocks.
Investigation of the e¤ect of the nancing choice between bank and mar-
ket debt on macroeconomic outcomes has been mostly based on reduced form
models. In studies with aggregate level VARs such as Kashyap, Stein and
Wilcox[23] or Oliner and Rudebusch[26] it is di¢ cult to distinguish between
the hypothesis that nancial frictions in general a¤ect the transmission of
economic shocks from the hypothesis that that the source of nancing mat-
ters. Micro level data as in Cantillo and Wright[5] can provide stronger
evidence on the importance of macroeconomic conditions for the choice be-
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tween bank and market debt, but without a general equilibrium framework
it is impossible to go in the other direction and judge the impact of nancing
choice on macroeconomic outcomes.
In this paper we develop a dynamic general equilibriummodel of the rms
choice between bank and bond market nancing based on the idea that banks
are better loan monitors than markets in nancial distress situations. Firms
facing nancial frictions can use either bank nancing or bond nancing.
Lending to rms is subject to a costly state verication problem as in [6].
Banks are better monitors than debt markets, but their superior lending
technology requires them to spend more resources per dollar of loans before
the rm produces. Market debt has higher monitoring costs, and it may
require a xed under-writing cost. This paper studies the implications of the
model for the steady state of such an economy.
The use of a dynamic general equilibrium framework allows us to make
a more quantitative assessment of the magnitude of frictions required to
generate realistic nancing choice patterns. It also allows investigation of
nancing choice dynamics in reaction to structural changes in nancing costs
as well as in reaction to business cycles.
Our modeling of banks as better monitors in the costly state verication
framework is based on empirical evidence suggesting that bankskey advan-
tage is in dealing with nancial distress situations. Bank loans are easier to
renegotiate, and banks have a better understanding of the businesses they are
dealing with than bondholders, for example by forcing borrowers to maintain
a transactions account at the bank[25]. As a result banks are more capable
of dealing with problems such as risk shifting in default, and they are less
likely to engage in ine¢ cient liquidation of rms[18][5][3].
In contrast to most papers that model costly state verication in dynamic
general equilibrium, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst, [6], and Bernanke Gertler
and Gilchrist[2], we assume that rmsproduction technology exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale. As a result, rmsnancing choice depend on their
net worth. Our analysis shows that di¤erences in net worth may be impor-
tant in accounting for the choices between bank and bond nancing observed
in the data. In particular, as in the data, higher net worth reduces the likeli-
hood of choosing bank nancing(see Cantillo and Wright (2000)[5] and Su
(2005)[33] for evidence on this point). This occurs in our model despite the
fact that all rms are equally productive ex-ante, before signing the nancial
contract. One could imagine that the link between net worth and nancing
choice is natural in the presence of a xed cost of issuing bonds. However,
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the benchmark model produces a strong negative correlation between bank
nancing and net worth even without the xed cost. Intuitively, higher net
worth reduces the probability of nancial distress, which makes the banks
comparative advantage in handling nancial distress less valuable. The direct
link between net worth and nancing choice in the model is in contrast with
most previous theoretical work that has explained why less productive rms
may prefer bank loans, with the link between rm size and bank nancing ex-
plained through a positive correlation between rm size and productivity(see
for example [29]and [11]).
The benchmark model , where the only cost of bond nancing is the cost
of auditing distressed rms, cannot explain the high relative use of bank
nancing in Europe without unrealistically low costs of bank nancing. 1
Therefore, we extend the model by assuming that issuing a bond in Europe
also requires a small xed cost. The extra cost is motivated by evidence
that until recently bond nancing was more expensive in Europe than in
the US[32]. The xed cost assumption is motivated by evidence of large
economies of scale in market debt issue costs, which are not present for bank
debt[10][7]. We nd that a small xed cost of bond issue (around 0:22%
of the average value of issued bonds) can explain most of the discrepancy
between the relative amount of bank nancing in Europe and the US. To the
degree that bond markets in Europe have become more competitive[32], the
ratio of bond to bank nancing in Europe may converge to that in the US.
Finally, we examine the importance of explicitly modeling the choice be-
tween bank and market debt for aggregate output and consumption. We nd
that for reasonable calibrations, the steady state aggregates of the model are
virtually identical to those of a model with only one type of nancial inter-
mediary with monitoring costs that are an average of those of the bank and
bond contracts. This suggests that at least for the analysis of the steady
state, a researcher interested only in aggregates may choose to ignore the
choice between bank and market nancing.
Several papers have studied the choice between bank and market debt
in partial equilibrium (prominent examples include Rajan[29], Diamond[11],
Holmstrom and Tirole[21]and Bolton and Freixas[3]). The general message
of most of these papers is that more protable(for a xed loan size) or higher
quality rms tend to prefer market debt, while lower quality rms will pre-
1Europe refers to the Euro Area in this paper.
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fer bank loans. Holmstrom and Tirole[21] distinguish between unmonitored
lending(market bonds) and monitored lending(bank lending), where moni-
toring increases entrepreneur e¤ort and the success probability of projects.
Their model generates a negative link between bank nacncing and net worth,
just like our model. Meh and Moran(2007)[24] incorporate the Holmstrom
and Tirole model into a fully specied dynamic general equilibrium model
with entrepreneur and bank capital dynamics.The model in this paper ex-
amines a mechanism for the link betwee net worth and nancing choice
which complements the moral hazard based mechanism in Holmstrom and
Tirole[21], while being more focused on the role of banks in managing nan-
cial distress emphsized by the empirical evidence. Furthermore, Holmstrom
and Tirole only explore the extreme assumptions of a xed project size and
variable project size with linear returns. Assuming linear returns as in Meh
and Morans paper eliminates any possible link between the size of rms and
nancing choice, while assuming only a xed project size is usually unrealis-
tic.
Perhaps the closest papers to this one are Cantillo and Wright[5] and De
Fiore and Uhlig[14]. Cantillo and Wrights model generates a negative link
between net worth and nancing and bank nancing due to a higher default
rate for smaller rms and banks providing cheaper reorganisation in default.
They use a partial equilibrium framework with a xed project size. As a
result their framework ignores the possibility that larger rms may prefer
bank nancing if they are allowed to undertake a larger project and (as in
their model and in essentially all applications of the costly state verication
framework) monitoring costs are increasing in the size of the project. This
e¤ect is eliminated by assumption in a xed project size model. This paper
explores the intermediate case of variable project size with nonlinear returns
and provides conditions that generalize some of the insights from the xed
project size model to the more general setup.
De Fiore and Uhlig[14] model the rms choice between bank and bond
nancing in a costly state verication framework and integrate this choice
into a standard RBC framework. They model banks as o¤ering better ex
ante screening of projects at a cost, generating a tradeo¤ in which lower
productivity entrepreneurs prefer bank nancing. The realism of their focus
on superior ex ante screening by banks is unclear. In fact, it may be more
realistic to model bond market lenders as better screeners of projects due
to the screening activities of bond rating agencies and investment banks[17].
Furthermore, the prediction of their model that more protable rms prefer
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market debt is empirically controversial(see Su (2005)[33] and Cantillo and
Wright[5]). Furthermore, their model does not capture the key stylized fact
that the use of bank nancing relative to market debt decreases with the size
of rms. 2
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows: section 2 describes the
model and provides a su¢ cient condition for the model to match the empirical
link between rm size and the choice between bank and market debt. Section
3 discusses the results of numerical simulations of the models steady state.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The model features overlapping generations of risk neutral entrepreneurs, a
representative risk averse worker and a continuum of pefectly competitive -
nancial intermediaries. Entrepreneurs produce all the output in the economy
using capital and labour. They accumulate net worth using capital. When
their accumulated net worth is insu¢ cient to fully fund their desired output
level, they require loans from nancial intermediaries. Due to information
frictions, loans require using one of two types of nancial intermediaries:banks
and bond mutual funds. The di¤erences between these intermediaries and
the choice between them will be described in greater detail below.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
The heart of the model is the entrepreneurs intratemporal nancing and pro-
duction decision. Therefore we start by describing the nancial contracting
environment in any given period.
2A recent paper by Champonnois[7] estimates a structural model of bank versus bond
nancing that reproduces the empirical link between the use of bank loans and rm size,
assuming that larger rms have systematically higher productivity levels than smaller
rms. The two period nature of the model and the assumption that entrepreneurs do
not have any net worth(no equity) makes integration of the model into standard dsges
di¢ cult, and may miss important dynamics of nancing choice. Also, it is not clear that
larger rms are always more productive.
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2.1.1 Entrepreneur Production and Financing Decisions for a Fixed
Level of Net Worth
Entrepreneur j produces nal output using the production function
yjt = zt!jtk

jtl

jt; , 0 <   +  < 1;
The rm specic productivity shock !jt 2 [0;1) is i.i.d across both en-
trepreneurs and time, has a CDF (!), a PDF (!) and E!jt = 1: !jt is
unknown when signing the nancial contract. We dene yjt  Eyjt = ztkjtljt:
The realisation of !jt is the private information of the entrepreneur, but can
be observed by a type i intermediary at a cost of iyjt: zt is an aggregate
productivity shock with a mean of 1.
Entrepreneurs rent capital at a rate rt and buy labour from households
at a wage rate wt. Production requires spending xjt = rtkjt + wtljt before
output is obtained. The entrepreneur has njt in internal funds available, of
which he devotes njt  njt to the project. If the desired xjt exceeds the
entrepreneurs internal funds dedicated to the project, the entrepreneur will
require external nancing from a lender. Alternatively, we can think of the
entrepreneur as being able to post a collateral of njt before output is realized:
Any loan below njt does not involve any nancing frictions or other costs.
But any part of the loan above njt will be subject to information frictions.
There is a continuum of fully diversied nancial intermediaries of two
types: banks and mutual funds, indexed by i 2 fb;mg: Both intermediaries
collect funds from households, and use them to make loans to entrepreneurs.
Competition for borrowers ensures that the nancial intermediaries make
zero prots. Because nancial intermediaries can fully diversify the idiosyn-
cratic risk of the entrepreneurs, households are risk neutral with respect to
intermediariesloan portfolios. Because the loans are intratemporal and risk
free, the required gross rate of return is 1:
The di¤erence between the two types of intermediaries is that banks are
better informed about borrowers than mutual funds. This superior informa-
tion makes banks better monitors in case of nancial distress. In particular,
banks can observe !jt at a lower cost than mutual funds.
Banks can learn !jt at a cost of byjt:Mutual funds can learn !jt at a cost
of myjt;where m > b:With a more general interpretation of audit costs as
nancial distress costs one can imagine for example that auditing prevents
entrepreneur from taking on risky projects that may benet him but reduces
the expected value of the assets obtained by lender, and banks are better at
controlling this risk-shifting. In order to o¤er lower cost monitoring, banks
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must spend (xjt  njt), where  > 0: These could be interpreted directly as
costs of gathering more information on lenders. They could also be seen as
a reduced form for costs related to frictions between banks and depositors in
a model where banks cannot accumulate any capital. 3 At the same time,
bond mutual funds may require a xed cost Cm in order to issue a bond.
To simplify notation we can abstract from time and entrepreneur sub-
scripts. It is convenient to rst pick the optimal amounts of capital and
labour given a total expenditure x = rk + wl and characterize the solu-
tion to the contract in terms of x and the bankruptcy threshhold !. For
a given expenditure level the optimal expected output is y = Mx; where
M = z 

rw
: Once we have solved the nancial contract, factor demands
are given by k = 
r
x and l = 
w
x:We start by solving for the entrepreneurs
production level when he is restricted to self nancing.The expenditure level
without access to external nancing solves
ea = maxxMx
 + (n  x)
subject to
x  n:
x  0:
Depending on the availability of internal funds, the entrepreneur either
picks the rst-best interior solution xa = x^  (M)1=(1 ), or he sets xa = n:
In fact since x^ is independent of n; any entrepreneur with n above a certain
thresshold value will prefer self-nancing.
We now turn to the contract conditional on the entrepreneur requiring
external nancing and having chosen a type i intermediary. Let Ri be the
required gross rate of return to the lender(Rb = 1+  ; Rm = 1): Because the
entrepreneur has access to a storage technology, his opportunity cost of funds
is 1. The optimal contract species a state contingent repayment schedule
and the set of audited states in order to maximize entrepreneur prots subject
to incentive compatibility constraints for the entrepreneur and the lenders
break-even constraint.The distribution of ! and the auditing costs satisfy
the conditions in Gale and Hellwig [16] for the optimal contract to be a debt
contract with a threshhold ! such that the repayment is b(!) = y for !  !
and b(!) = !y if ! > !.
3For example, we can imagine 1 period bankers that can run away with and consume
a proportion  of the loan. In this case the loan contract must ensure that the expected
repayments by entrepreneurs net of the audit costs and the deposit repayments exceed
(xjt   njt); which is exactly the banks break-even constraint in the nancial contract.
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We dene the entrepreneurs and the lendersexpected shares of y as
f(!) =
Z 1
!
!d  ![1  (!)] for the entrepreneur.
m(!) =
Z !
0
!d + ![1  (!)]  (!) for the lender.
Like other papers(e.g Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist[2] and Covas and Den
Haan[9]), we assume that the hazard rate of ! is increasing in ! at the
optimal !;
Assumption 1:
d
d!

(!)
1  (!)

> 0, (!) > 0 when ! > 0.
This assumption is satised by commonly used distributions such as the
lognormal or uniform distributions. Dene Ci  0 to be the xed cost of
issuing debt for type i intermediary, where Cb = 0: Dene 1(x   n > 0) as
the indicator function for x  n > 0:
The optimal contract with type i 2 fb;mg nancial intermediary solves
ei = max
x;!;n
f(!i)Mx

i + (n  ni)
subject to
m(!i)yi  Ri(xi   ni) + Ci1(x  n > 0) (1)
ni  n: (2)
ni  0 (3)
xi   n  0 (4)
If (0) = 0,R = 1 and Cm = 0; then x   n > 0 whenever n < x^; the
rst best level of output. Otherwise, when Cm = 0 we can guarantee that
x   n > 0 on an interval of n0s (0; n); where n tends to x^ as  and  go
to 0 (See the appendix for the proof): When Cm > 0; x   n > 0 as long as
Cm is not too large. In this section, we assume x   n > 0: 4 The numerical
4Alternatively one can think of all the proofs in this section as applying only to those
rms that are not rationed.
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algorithm in the next sections allows for the possibility of rationing. Let i; i;
 i be the lagrange multipliers for constraints (1-3) respectively. Besides the
complementary slackness conditions, the rst order conditions are
x : Mx 1i [f(!i) + im(!i)] = iRi (5)
! : f 0(!i) + im0(!i) = 0 (6)
n :  i + iRi = i + 1: (7)
Finally, the entrepreneur picks Eye = max[ea; 
e
m; 
e
b]:
The following lemma collects some straightforward results that simplify
the solution of the model and help us characterize the nancing choice of
entrepreneurs:
Lemma 1 a) At the optimum, m0(!) > 0 and the banks break-even con-
straint is binding.b) Under the assumption that 0(!) = (!) > 0 the en-
trepreneur always chooses Maximal Equity Participation(MEP): n = n: 5
c)external nancing is never optimal if the entrepreneurs wealth constraint
does not bind. d)Under assumption 1,0(!) > 0:e)d!
dn
< 0 and d!
dCm
> 0:
f)d!
d
< 0 as long as Cm is not too large:
Proof. see the appendix.
Due to the i.i.d nature of the productivity shock !jt; the only ex-ante
heterogeneity among entrepreneurs is due to di¤erent levels of net worth
njt: There are several e¤ects that determine the desirability of bank or bond
nancing for a given level of net worth. The model emphasizes the role
of banks in reducing costs of nancial distress. Since the default rate is
decreasing in net worth (d!
dn
< 0) for a xed nancing type, it seems natural
then that holding y constant, smaller rms that are more likely to default
for a given nancing type will gravitate towards banks. At the same time a
5The strict optimality of MEP contracts relies on our limited liability assumption
concerning n   n. Gale and Hellwig[16]assume n   n can be used as collateral. In that
case the optimal level of equity participation is indeterminate, and the MEP contract only
weakly dominates any other contract.
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higher net worth increases the projects expected output y, which increases
expected default costs (!)y for a given  and !: For a xed project size
x; the extra cost per dollar of bank loan (x  n) penalizes small rms with
higher x   n. Things are less clear cut when rms can adjust the size of
their project. Higher net worth reduces the desired leverage ratio x n
n
: 6
Decomposing the ex-ante cost of bank nancing (x   n) as   x n
n

n; we
see that it may actually decline in n; though this does not have to be the
case. We cannot theoretically rule out that the last two e¤ects overwhelms
the e¤ect of a lower ! and makes bank nancing more attractive for larger
rms for general values of n and  but, we will nd conditions for larger
rms to prefer bond nancing conditions on certain range of n0s and 0s: The
numerical analysis in the next section will examine the plausibility of those
conditions.
Before proceeding with the analysis for the decreasing returns to scale,
we can verify that under the standard assumption in for example Carlstrom
and Fuerst[6] or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist[2], of constant returns to
scale and no xed cost of market nance the choice of nancing type does not
depend on net worth. Therefore, all rms in our setup would choose the same
nancial intermediary if  = 1: The only possibility for a link between net
worth and nancial intermediation choice in the constant returns to scale case
arises when there is a xed cost of market nancig Cm > 0 in an environment
in which market nancing would dominate when Cm = 0 or when some rms
would be rationed at x  n = 0 with market nancing:
Proposition 2 a)Suppose  = 1 and for each i M > Ri
1 (0) : If Cm = 0;then
the optimal choice of nancial intermediary is independent of n: Therefore,
all rms choose the same nancial intermediary type. All rms prefer bank
nancing when  <  and all rms prefer bond nancing when  >  ; for
some  > 0: b) If Cm > 0, any rm rationed at x   n by the bond contract
will pick bank nancing. Among non-rationed rms, If the optimal form of
intermediation is bank nancing when Cm = 0 then this is also the optimal
choice for all rms when Cm > 0: If the optimal nancial intermediation
6For the leverage ratio, note that combining the foc for x and the break even constraint
we have (1  n=x+ CRx )

f+m
m

= 1: The second term in brackets is decreasing in !: So
x=n must be increasing in ! if C = 0: The comparative statics with respect to n and M
now follow from the relation between ! and those parameters. With C > 0 its is possible
for x=n to decrease in !; but by continuity d(x n)=ndn < 0 should still hold for a small
enough C:
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is market nancing when Cm = 0 ; then in the economy with Cm > 0 there
exists a threshold n^ such that all non rationed rms with n < n^ prefer bank
nancing while all non rationed rms with n  n^ prefer market nancing.
Proof. a) Consider rst the case when Cm = 0: Our assumption that
M > Ri
1 (0) ensures that x   n > 0 for all rms(see the appendix for
the proof when  < 1. The proof for  = 1 is similar). Using the break-
even constraint of the nancial intermediary to solve for x, the entrepre-
neurs expected prot with type i intermediary is ei = f(!i)M
nRi
Ri m(!)M :
eb   em =Mn

(1+)f(!b)
(1+) m(!b)M  
f(!m)
1 m(!m)M

Mn > 0 i¤ > 0: From the
rst order conditions, d!
dn
= 0 when  = 1: Since n does not directly a¤ect
f(!) or m(!)  is independent of n, making the sign of eb   em indepen-
dent of n: Since d
e
d
< 0; eb   em > 0 when  = 0: d
e
d
< 0; and therefore
eb   em is decreasing in  . Finally, lim
!1
eb   em < 0: By the continuity
of eb   em in  , there exists a unique  such that eb   em > 0 whenever
 <  and eb   em < 0 for  >  : b) Next, consider the case when Cm > 0:
Any rm that would be rationed by the bond contract will obviously pick
the bank contract, since by our assumption on M the optimal bank contract
dominates choosing x = n: Now consider rms that are not rationed by the
bond contract. The relative prot of bank nancing versus bond nancing
is eb   em =M
h
n+ f(!m)Cm
1 m(!m)M
i
: If  > 0 (all rms prefer bank nancing
when Cm = 0), then bank nancing is preferred i¤ n >   1 f(!m)Cm1 m(!)M : Since
the last expression is negative and n  0; this constraint never binds and all
rms pick bank nancing in this case. If  = 0, then clearly all rms prefer
bank nancing. If  < 0 (all rms prefer bond nancing when Cm = 0),
then a rm prefers bank nancing i¤ n <   1

f(!m)Cm
1 m(!m)M  n^: All other rms
prefer bond nancing. Note that ! remains independent of n if x   n > 0
regardless of Cm: From the same rst order conditions, ! is also independent
of Cm. As a result n^ can be computed as the product of Cm and a term that
depends only on M:
The empirical calibrations in the next section suggests that the extra
intermediation fee of the bank  is quite low, casting doubt on the ability of
the constant returns to scale model to generate a negative relation between
net worth and nancing choice, except through the rationing of small rms
by the bond contract due to the xed cost. 7
7We did a few quick tests of the constant returns to scale model in a partial equilibrium
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We would like to establish some conditions guaranteeing that the model
with  < 1 reproduces the pattern observed in the data where smaller rms
prefer bank nancing and larger rms prefer market nancing. In particular
if the derivative of the relative bank versus bond contract prot with respect
to wealth d(
e
b em)
dn
< 0, and rms choose both bank and bond nancing then
it must be the case that for some n rms with n < n prefer bank nancing
while rms with n  n prefer bond nancing.
The following proposition gives a su¢ cient condition guaranteeing the
existence of an interval of values of  2 (0;  ) and an interval of n 2 (0; n)
values for which bond nancing becomes more attractive as n increases. The
key requirement is that bank nancing lowers the shadow cost of external
nance :
Proposition 3 Suppose that dm
dm
> 0 at n = 0: Then there exists a neigh-
bourhood N"  R2+ of n = 0 =  such that d(
e
b em)
dn
< 0 whenever ( ; n) 2 N":
Therefore there exist a   and a n such that whenever  <   and n < n
we have d(
e
b em)
dn
< 0:
Proof. By the envelope theorem d(
e
b em)
dn
= (1+)(!b( ; n)) (!m(0; n)) 
S( ; n)  m(0; n): Since b < m; dmdm > 0 at n = 0
d!
dC
> 0 and 0i(!) > 0;
we have S(0; 0)   m(0; 0) = b(0; 0)   m(0; 0) < 0: By the maximum the-
orem, for either i = b or m, !i( ; n) is continuous on R2+ at  = n = 0:
Therefore S( ; n)   m( ; n) is continuous in ( ; n) at (0; 0). Together with
S(0; 0)   m(0; 0) < 0 this implies the existence of the required N" neigh-
bourhood. The existence of   and n is immediate by taking any rectangle
contained in N":
d
d
= @
@
+0(!)d!
d
: Since @
@
> 0 and 0(!); d!
d
 0 is a su¢ cient condition
for d
d
> 0: d!
d
 0 holds for the standard costly state verication model with
a xed project size. It may still hold with a variable project size as long
as x does not decline too much when  increases. 8 Intuitively, increasing
setting, with the wage and interest rate xed by the steady state of an open economy
where there are no nancial frictions in the rest of the world. Bank nancing was optimal
in those tests even for  = 0:08 which is much higher than the evidence presented in
Erosa(2001)[13].
8x must be decreasing in  : Let A  Mx 1i f(!i)+im(!i)i . From the rst order
condition for x; dA(x();!();)d =
@A
@x
dx
d +
@A
@!
d!
d +
@A
@ = 0:
@A
@x < 0 and
@A
@! < 0. Since
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 raises the required repayments for a given expenditure x. If x does not
react too strongly , this requires an increase in the coupon rate and hence
an increase in the default rate. If we had constant returns to scale ( = 1),
the entrepreneur would react to a higher  by lowering x so much that !
would decline. Intuition suggests that with su¢ ciently decreasing returns to
scale the reaction of x is small enough that ! may actually increase as in the
model with an exogeneously xed project size. At least, the decrease in !
in response to a higher  would be small enough to allow the positive direct
e¤ect on  of a higher  to dominate. More formally, we have:
Lemma 4 Suppose that at n =  = 0; lim
!0
(!) > 0; lim
!0
! < 1; and
lim
!0
m0(!) > 0: Then lim
!0
d!m
d
 0; and there exists a  > 0 such that d
d
> 0
at  = n = 0 whenever  < :
Proof. See the appendix.
The requirement that lim
!0
(!) > 0 may be problematic. Certainly this
condition holds for the uniform distribution. For the lognormal distribution
the condition is always satised if the standard deviation  of ln ! is high
enough, but for typical calibrations(as well for the calibration in section 3),
lim
!0
(!) > 0 requires the presence of a xed cost Cm > 0: The numerical cal-
ibration in section 3 shows that the model with decreasing returns to scale
can generate a realistic negative relation between net worth and bank nanc-
ing even without the xed cost. This is in contrast to the constant returns
to scale model which requires a xed cost in order to have a non degenerate
nancing choice. Also, the net worth-nancing choice link emerges in the nu-
merical analysis for  = 0:9; suggesting that the degree of decreasing returns
to scale required by the theoretical results above is plausible.
If we have the stronger condition that lim
!0
d!m
d
> 0; we can also derive
an interesting result about the e¤ect of a general improvement in the au-
diting technology for both banks and bond funds. Let s  m=b > 1: We
are interested in the consequences of a reduction in the cost of auditing b
for a xed ratio of market to bank debt auditing e¢ ciency s: If a reduc-
tion in b leads more rms to prefer bond nancing, then according to the
@(!;)
@ > 0 and
@m(!;)
@ < 0,
@A
@ < 0: This implies that
@A
@x
dx
d +
@A
@!
d!
d > 0: Let  > 0:
Since d
e
d < 0, x  0 implies that ! > 0: But then @A@x dxd + @A@! d!d < 0; which is
impossible. Therefore, dxd < 0:
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model a general improvement in the cost of dealing with nancial frictions
causes a switch towards more market debt. Intuitively this should be the
case: if auditing technology in general improves the importance of banks as
better auditors should diminish. Thus the model also provides a potential
explanation for the shift towards more market debt nancing in the last 30
years(Samolyk,2004)[31]. 9We can show that this is what happens if we have
su¢ ciently strong decreasing returns to scale(low ):
Proposition 5 Suppose d!m
d
 0 and lim
!0
!m > 0: Then for a xed s > 1 ,
there exists a  > 0 such that
d(eb em)
db
> 0 for  2 (0; ) :
Proof. By the envelope theorem, ,d(
e
b em)
db
= s(!m; m)(!m)Mx

m  
(!b; b)(!b)Mx

b : Since
d!m
d
 0; and d!
d
< 0 (from lemma 1f) !m > !b:
This, together with @(!;)
@
> 0 and 0(!) > 0 implies that (!m; m)(!m) >
(!b; b)(!b) for any  > 0: Since lim
!0
!m > 0 and s > 1; this implies that
lim!0 s(!m; m)(!m) > lim!0 (!b; b)(!b): But then since lim!0Mx
 =
M; we have that lim!0
d(eb em)
db
> 0: Therefore, there exists a  > 0 such
that d(
e
b em)
db
> 0 when  < :
The su¢ cient condition in proposition 5 holds when Cm > 0 in a neigh-
bourhood of n = 0; as long as ! and d!
d
are continuous in  at 0 :
Lemma 6 Suppose that !, d!m
d
is right continous in  at  = n = 0 and
Cm > 0. Then lim
!0
!m > 0 and there exists a 
 > 0 such that d!m
d
> 0
at n = 0 for any  < : Furthermore, these properties continue to hold for
n 2 (0; n); where n is a positive number:
Proof. See the appendix.
2.1.2 The Dynamic Behaviour of Entrepreneurs
9Samolyk [31] nds that the proportion of short term nonnancial business lending
done by commercial banks in the US has declined from around 75% to about 50% between
1974 and 2004. This gure may overestimate the decline of bank-like lending to the degree
that many nance company loans(that have increased signicantly during this period) may
be very similar to bank loans.
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We model entrepreneur savings in a similar way to Bernanke,Gertler and
Gilchrist[2]. There are overlapping generations of two-period lived entrepre-
neurs. There is a measure 1 of old entrepreneurs in each period that can
operate a project and then exit the economy. Each period, they are replaced
by a measure 1 of young entrepreneurs. Young entrepreneurs cannot produce
or work, and they are born without any endowment. Entrepreneurs are risk
neutral and only care about consumption when old. An old entrepreneur
begins the period with a stock of capital kejt. The entrepreneur can rent out
his capital to obtain njt = kejt(1 + rt   ); where  is the depreciation rate
of capital. Then, the entrepreneur makes the nancing decision in order to
maximise expected income Eyejt: Based on net worth njt and the aggregate
state of the economy; the entrepreneur decides whether to produce with a
bank loan, produce with a mutual fund loan or rely only on njt for funding.
Next, if the entrepreneur has decided to contract with a nancial intermedi-
ary the contract is signed for a loan of rtkjt+wtljt njt, and the entrepreneur
rents capital and hires labour. If the entrepreneur prefers autarky he uses
part of his net worth to nance his production, and he stores the remaining
funds njt   njt till the end of the period.
Finally, the idiosyncratic shocks !jt are realised, entrepreneurs produce,
pay for capital and labour and deliver the loan repayment b(!jt): This leaves
entrepreneurs with income yejt. At this point old entrepreneurs get to consume
all their income with probability e: In this case they consume cjt = yejt,
leaving the young without any capital in the beginning of the next period.
With a probability 1   e; the young get all the income as a bequest from
the old entrepreneurs. In this case the young entrepreneur saves kej;t+1 =
yejt.
10In the case of constant returns to scale this structure gives exactly
the same saving function as the original Bernanke et al. [2] model with
innitely lived entrepreneurs with a constant death probability of e: With
constant returns to scale, the risk neutrality of entrepreneurs would make it
optimal for them to maximise expected prots from production inside each
period, despite the innite horizon. Therefore, we can use the previously
derived nancial contract to describe entrepreneur production decisions. The
decreasing returns to scale assumption complicates matters. If the default
rate were independent of net worth, then the value of the rm would still
10This outcome can be derived from a negotiation between old and young entrepreneurs
over yej;t: The old make a take it or leave it o¤er to the young with probability e; while
the young make a take it or leave it o¤er to the old with probability 1  e:
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be increasing in expected current prots, and the static contract would still
be optimal. Since the default rate is decreasing in net worth maximising
expected current prots is no longer optimal. In particular the entrepreneur
may prefer a lower project size relative to the static case in order to lower
the default rate and reduce the chances of entering the next period with
zero net worth. In combination with the discrete nancing choice this makes
the optimisation problem with decreasing returns to scale considerably more
challenging, particularly if the goal is to eventually study nancing choices
in general equilibrium with aggregate shocks. The overlapping generations
assumption sidesteps this issue. 11
2.2 Workers
There is a measure 1 of risk averse workers. The representative worker
chooses sequences of consumption and saving to maximise E0
P1
t=0 
t ln ch;t
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
ch;t + kh;t+1 = kh;t(1 + rt   ) + wt (8)
where rt and wt are the rental rate and the real wage rate. Workers rent
out capital and work. They can then use their income to lend to nancial
intermediaries Lt  rtkht + wtlht. Both banks and bond mutual funds are
completely diversied with respect to entrepreneursidiosyncratic risk.This,
in addition to their intratemporal nature, makes the gross rate of return on
loans 1. At the end of the period all payments are made and workers consume
and save. From the workersoptimisation problem, we get the standard Euler
equation:
1
cht
= Et
1
ch;t+1
(1 + rt+1   ) (9)
In the steady state, this equation pins down the interest rate at r =
1

  1 + :
11Another assumption that would preserve the optimality of static expected prot max-
imisation would be allowing the entrepreneur to diversify away the risk of default by
holding a continuum of projects, and generating di¤erences among entrepreneurs through
ex-ante idiosyncratic shocks(occuring before the nancial contracting decision is made).
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Timeline of the model during a period:
1. zt and the value of 1ed are known to everyone.
2 Based on njt = kejt(1 + rt   ) the entrepreneur picks contract type i 2 fa; b;mg
and the desired amount of loans, capital and labour.
3. Entrepreneurs rent out their capital. Workers rent out their capital and work.
Households extend the loans through nancial intermediaries
4. Entrepreneur output is realized and all payments are made.
5. Entrepreneurs and households consume and save for the next period.
2.3 The Competitive Equilibrium
We are now in a position to dene the steady state competitive equi-
librium for this economy. The state of each entrepreneur is described by
Sjt =
 
!jt; k
e
jt; 1
e
d

; where 1ed indicates entrepreneur death, with a joint prob-
ability measure Ft(S): Let Ct = ch;t +
R
cjtdF , nt =
R
njtdF; xt =
R
xjtdF ,
lt =
R
ljtdF; and it = Kt+1   (1   )Kt where Kt = kh;t +
R
kejtdF: Finally
dene 1b, 1m, 1a and 1s as the indicator functions respectively for bank -
nancing, market debt nancing, autarky and entrepreneur default.
A steady state competitive equilibrium consists of capital rental rate and
wage rates (r; w) entrepreneur and worker consumption and saving policies
ce(Sjt); k
e
j;+1(Sjt); ch(k
h
t ); kh;+1(kh;t)
	
and decisions

1m(k
e
jt); 1b(k
e
jt); 1a(k
e
jt); 1s(k
e
jt; !jt)
	
such that
1. The capital market clears: kh +
R
kejtdF =
R
kjtdF:
2. The labour market clears: lt = 1:
2. The output market clears: y = C+i+
R
1s1bbyjtdF+
R
1s1mmyjtdF+

R
1b(xjt   njt)dF + Cm
R
1mdF:
3. The loan market clears: rk + wl   n = x  n:
4. Financial contracts are optimal, entrepreneurs maximise their expected
income Eyejt and pick k
e
j;t+1 optimally.
5. Households pick consumption and saving optimally.
7. F is an invariant distribution: given the conditional probability func-
tion Q(S;A) and given any event A;
F (A) =
R
A
Q(S; S 0)F (dS
0
) .
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3 Results
3.1 Calibration
The model period is one quarter. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst[6], we set
 = 0:99;  = 0:02:We set aggregate productivity to z = 1: Following the
discussion in Restuccia and Rogerson[30] and Jaimovich and Rebelo(08) we
set  = 0:9 , implying a prot share of around 10%: A  of 0:9 is in the upper
bound of empirical estimates. If anything, choosing a relatively high value of
 should make it more di¢ cult for the model to generate a link between rm
size and nancing choice. We set the share of capital to one third, giving
 = 0:3. The entrepreneursdeath rate is 3%; based on Bernanke,Gertler
and Gilchrist[2].
The calibration of m and b does not have any precedents in the litter-
ature, requiring us to make some extra assumptions. Let s = m
b
: We dene
the average audit cost;
  b
R
1s1byjtdFR
1syjtdF
+m
R
1s1myjtdFR
1syjtdF
= bp^+m (1  p^) ; where p^ 
R
1s1byjtdFR
1syjtdF
:
To simplify the calibration we approximate p^ by p 
R
1b(xjt njt)dFR
(1 1a)(xjt njt)dF and set
 = pb+(1 p)m = b[p+(1 p)s]: 12 Given  and p; we could solve for b
and m if we knew s:We approximate p by the average ratio of bank nance to
total debt nance over 1997-2003 in the US and in the Euro area, as reported
in De Fiore and Uhlig[14]. This gives us p = 0:425 for the US and p = 0:88 for
the Euro area. As there are several estimates of  in the litterature, we take
an intermediate estimate of  = 0:15 from Carlstrom and Fuerst[6]. This
leaves s: In line with our focus on bankslower cost of dealing with nancial
distress, we use evidence from Gilson,Kose and Lang[18] on the probability
of private restructuring as opposed to formal bankruptcy and on the relative
costs of these procedures to determine s: Let i be the probability of private
restructuring for a debt of type i: Let m be the proportional cost of private
restructuring and m^ be the proportional cost of formal bankruptcy, where
due to lack of evidence we assume these costs are the same for both bank
and non-bank debt. Since our model does not distinguish between these two
forms of nancial distress, we assume that i = m m+(1 m)m^:This implies
12The approximation is exact if we have constant returns to scale:
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that s = m
b
= m m+(1 m)m^
b m+(1 b)m^ =
mh+(1 m)
bh+(1 b) ; where h = m=m^:Gilson,Kose and
Lang[18] estimate b = 0:9 and m = 0:375: They also report that the average
successful private restructuring takes 15:4months, as opposed to 28:5months
for the average unsuccesful restructuring and formal bankruptcy. Assuming
that the costs of these procedures is proportional to their duration, we get
an estimate of h = 15:4=28:5 = 0:54: With these numbers we nd s = 1:412;
b = 0:121 and m = 0:171 for the US. For the Euro area, we assume the
same s and the same , giving b = 0:143 and m = 0:202:
13
In the US calibration we assume that there are no xed costs of issuing
bonds(Cm = 0). In this case, we pick the other parameters to roughly match
the quarterly default rate for the US of 0:974% reported in Carlstrom and
Fuerst[6], the ratio of bank nancing to market debt nancing from De Fiore
and Uhlig[14] and the costs of bank intermediation per dollar of loans in
developed economies from Erosa[13]. 14 For the European calibration, we
pick Cm to match the di¤erence between bond issue costs in the US and
Europe from Santos and Tsatsaronis[32].
We assume that ! follows a log-normal distribution where, ln! has a
standard deviation  and mean  2=2:
We set  = 0:185: We try several values of  ranging from 0:005% to
2%: The most successful calibration has  = 0:25%: In combination with the
costs of auditing nancially distressed rms, this value leads to a reasonable
estimate of total bank intermediation costs.
3.2 General Equilibrium Results
For the US, the model provides a rough match to default rates, the ratio
of bank to market debt and the costs of nancial intermediation in the US
with = 0:25% (table 1): The 2:8% (10:74% at an annual rate) default rate
obtained in our simulations is high relative to the 1% default rate used as
a target. However, the 1% estimate is biased downwards due to underrep-
resentation of small unincorporated rms in the sample[15]. Such rms are
13The idea that costs of nancial distress are higher in Europe is supported by Djankov
et als analysis of bankruptcy costs around the world[12]
14In the interpretation of the model where njt is partly used as collateral for loans that
are not subject to frictions instead of just being directly used for self nancing, we assume
that lending not subject to frictions is allocated between banks and markets in the same
proportion as lending subject to frictions.
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included in our model, and they are potentially important in explaining the
prevalence of bank nancing. The higher default rate in the simulations may
be quite compatible with the behaviour of those rms, particularly once one
realises that default in our model does not just represent formal bankruptcy
or liquidation but any failure to fully repay the promised coupon !y:The
models annual capital to output ratio of approximately 2:5 is not too far
from the average ratio for the US of 3 reported in[4], even though this ratio
was not targetted in the calibration.
The model generates a negative correlation between rm size and bank
nancing. In particular, the correlation between the bank nancing indica-
tor (1 if i = b; 0 otherwise) and n (our measure of the value of equity) is
signicantly negative. As discussed in the theoretical analysis of the nan-
cial contract, the negative link between n and the default threshhold ! is
probably the key mechanism producing this e¤ect.
The smallest rms in our model use bank loans. Next, intermediate size
rms use market debt. Finally the largest rms are nancially unconstrained.
Note that this cross sectional pattern also holds for the time series evolution
of a typical rm. So we can also interpret the results as a model of the
life-cycle of rm nancing choices. As the rm becomes older it evolves from
bank debt to market debt to a regime where nancing choices do not matter
very much.
Comparing the strength of this e¤ect in the model with actual data is
di¢ cult due to the limited availability of data on the division of debt between
bank and market sources. Nevertheless, this qualication we compare the
models predicted correlation between net worth and market debt issues with
the one indicator available in Compustat data- the existence of a bond rating.
Cantillo and Wright(2000) [5] were able to obtain more precise data on the
decomposition of debt between banks and markets for a subset of Compustat
rms. For that subsample, they nd a nearly perfect correlation between the
existence of a debt rating and the existence of outstanding market debt in a
given year. On the assumption that this strong correlation continues to hold
in the general Compustat sample, as well as using the fact that rms in our
model do not issue bank and market debt simultaneously and that debt in
our model lasts for only one period, we can associate the existence of a bond
rating in a given rm-year with the issuance of market debt. Therefore,
we compare the correlation between using market debt and net worth in
the model(calibrated at an annual frequency to match Compustats ratings
information) to the correlation between having a bond rating and net worth
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in Compustat between 1997 and 2006. From this perspective, our model is
rejected: the models correlation between net worth and issuance of market
debt is around 0:77 while in Compustat the correlation is only around 0:25:
There are several possible explanations for this failure. One possibility is that
Compustat contains very large rms that are nancially unconstrained in our
model. To check this, we reexamined the correlation in the Compustat data
excluding from the analysis the top 31% of rms by net worth that would
be nancially unconstrained according to the model. The correlation in the
restricted Compustat sample is around 0:21; again, far from the models
prediction. 15
The model without xed bond issue costs cannot match the ratio of bank
to market debt in Europe without assuming an extremely low bank adminis-
tration cost parameter (table 2). Even with  = 0:005%; we can only get a
ratio of bank nancing to market nancing of 2:43 in comparison to a ratio of
7:33 in the data. The problem is that lowering  in Europe even further leads
to an implausibly low estimate of the cost of bank intermediation per dollar
of loan in Europe relative to the cost in the US. It is certainly possible that
bank monitoring is cheaper in Europe. For example, we know that banks
in many European countries can acquire equity stakes in rms that they
lend to more easily than in the US. This may lower the cost of monitoring
loans(showing up in reduced form in the model either as a lower b=m or as
a lower  for a given b=s).
16 An alternative interpretation of this result
is that market nancing is relatively more expensive in Europe. Santos and
Tsatsaronis(2003)[32] nd that until 2001 average bond underwriting fees
in Europe exceeded American average underwriting fees by approximately
0:05%   0:8%: 17 The introduction of the Euro led to greater competition
among investment banks in the Euro area, lowering bond underwriting fees.
15There are several measurement issues that could also explain this discrepancy. The
assumption of perfect correlation between having a bond rating and having outstanding
market debt may be a bad approximation in our sample. Also, Compustat data is biased
biased towards larger rms that can issue equity.
16In contrast American banks could not hold equity in rms that they lend to until
1999, with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act. Even with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
act, European banks still have more freedom to own equity in borrowing rms(Barthet
al 2000). Santos(97) argues that in practice European banksequity holdings are small,
though one cannot exclude the possibility that even small equity holdings translate into
signicant reductions in bank monitoring costs.
17Their sample covers only international bond issues, which includes almost all European
corporate bond issues, but excludes many American bonds issued only domestically. One
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We can model the di¤erence in underwriting fees by allowing for positive
bond issuance costs in Europe. To capture this we specify a xed cost of
issuing market debt Cm > 0 in Europe in addition to the expected costs of
nancial distress. We assume that  = 0:25% in Europe as in our preferred
specication for the US. Like Santos and Tsatsaronis, we use the loan size
weighted average of issue costs per dollar of lending as our measure of average
issue costs.
The addition of a xed bond issue cost leads to a large increase in the
relative desirability of bank nancing (table 3). An average issue cost of
0:17%(Cm = 0:25%) almost triples the relative proportion of bank loans to
market loans in Europe. With an average issue cost of 0:22%(Cm = 0:35%)
we get a ratio of bank to bond nancing of 5:54 in Europe. The cost of
bank intermediation per dollar of loans in Europe is still estimated to be
signicantly lower than in the US (1:78% versus 2:72% in the US), but the
di¤erence is much more plausible than the one obtained trying to match the
relative amount of bank nancing in Europe without bond issue costs. This
estimate is signicantly lower than the estimates reported by Erosa[13] for
European countries. However, his estimates are for the year 1985. It is quite
possible that due to technological progress in the nancial sector, costs of
bank intermediation have declined signicantly since 1985.
Finding a lower cost of bank intermediation in Europe despite having the
same loan administration cost  ; a higher audit cost parameter  and the
same average default rate as in the USmay seem counterintuitive at rst. The
explanation lies in the audit cost function used. Recall that the audit cost is
Mx, which is concave in x:The average x nanced by the bank in Europe is
1:91. The average x nanced by the bank in the US is 1:34. This di¤erence
occurs due to the larger number of high n rms using bank nancing in
Europe, reected in a lower magnitude of the negative correlation between
n and bank nancing choice in Europe. The cost of bank intermediation per
dollar of loans is  +
M
R
1bx

jdFR
1b(xj nj)dF : The amount of bank loans in Europe is
more than double the amount in the US(the denominator). At the same time,
while the total amount of expenditure by bank nanced rms is larger, due to
the diminishing marginal cost of auditing and the higher average expenditure
nanced by a bank loan in Europe, the total auditing costs in Europe are
smaller relative to the amount of loans. As a result, we get a lower cost of
should also bear in mind that the market nance in our model is closer to commercial
paper, while Santos and Tsatsaronis cover longer term bonds.
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bank intermediation per dollar of loans in Europe.
The model has more limited success in matching some other stylized facts
about the distribution of rms. The model predicts a negative relation be-
tween the debt to equity ratio x n
n
and n; with a correlation of around  0:3
for the US, and  0:53 in Europe. This prediction is at odds with the empiri-
cal evidence for Compustat data reported in Frank and Goyal( 2005)[34]. In
fact the negative correlation between the leverage ratio(leverage is x
n
; that is
the debt to equity ratio minus 1) and net worth is so strong that it also leads
to a negative correlation between loan sizes and n. This prediction is again
probably unrealistic. There are several possible reactions to this problem.
First, the evidence for a positive link between leverage and size is not con-
clusive. Arellano,Bai and Zhang(2007) [1] examine data from the UK and
nd a negative correlation between leverage and size for the whole sample.
They only nd a positive leverage and size correlation for the largest rms
in the UK. To the degree that the compustat data oversamples the largest
American rms, Frank and Goyals conclusion on the correlation between
size and leverage is consistent with Arellano et al. 18 Second, these correla-
tions emerge in the model when restricting the analysis to rms that require
external nancing. For higher net worth rms, the Modigliani-Miller theo-
rem applies in our model, and the nancing choice is indeterminate. Those
rms could for example prefer higher leverage due to unmodeled tax trade-
o¤s between debt and equity. Therefore, our model is not necessarily at
odds with a positive size and leverage relation for the largest rms. Third,
the negative link between x   n and n does not necessarily mean that the
model predicts a negative correlation between n and overall lending. Recall
the alternative interpretation of the model according to which x   n is the
part of lending subject to frictions, with the total amount of lending rela-
tive to self-nancing being indeterminate. This interpretation is consistent
with an economy where rms with higher net worth borrow more, but the
amount of their borrowing subject to information frictions is lower than for
low net worth rms. Finally, like virtually all implementations of the CSV
model, we have assumed that the idiosyncratic shocks ! are i.i.d. Suppose
instead that ! follows an AR(1) process. In this case M is increasing in
E(!tj!t 1): A high sequence of !s would raise M: Since d(x n)=ndM > 0; the
rms leverage ratio would also increase for a given n. At the same time,
18Cooley and Quadrini(2001) also report that the leverage ratio is negatively correlated
with rm equity when the sample is not restricted to corporations.
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the rms net worth n should increase due to the higher recent protability.
In this case we may see a rise in n accompanied by a rise in x n
n
; despite
the negative direct relation between these two variable for a xed M: 19 Fi-
nally, we have followed the standard costly state verication framework in
restricting entrepreneurs to using only internal equity. Allowing rms in the
model to issue external equity subject to the typical quadratic issuance costs
(see for example Henessy and Whited[20]) would increase the cost of equity
disproportionately for the largest rms and encourage them to increase the
proportion of debt nancing.
Only around 40% of rms in our calibrations actually borrow. The re-
sult that most rms in our simulations are not nancially constrained is
unrealistic. For example Henessy and Whited (2006) [20] estimate a more
quantitative model of investment with nancial frictions and nd the pres-
ence of moderate nancing frictions even for large US corporations, though
as in our model they nd that nancial frictions are considerably less impor-
tant for larger rms. One result of the high proportion of self-nancing rms
in the model is the extremely low aggregate debt to equity ratio of around
0:07 predicted in our simulations. The actual aggregate debt to equity ratio
for 1997-2003 was 0:41 in the US and 0:61 in Europe [14].The debt to equity
ratio of borrowing rms is actually around 1.36 for our US calibrations, but
these rms only hold around 20% of assets and even less of the aggregate
equity. As a result, the total amount of debt to equity for all rms is low.
The key factor explaining the large number of nancially unconstrained
rms in our simulations is the aggressive saving behaviour of the entrepre-
neurs. This allows many rms to accumulate enough net worth to make
nancial frictions irrelevant. The largest rms in the model do not require
any external nancing. The simplest way to improve the models performance
in this respect is to increase the bargaining power of old entrepreneurs e:
This would directly reduce the entrepreneur dynasties ability to accumu-
late large net worth levels. For example, increasing e to 10% while keeping
all other parameters at their level in the preferred US calibration increases
the aggregate debt to equity ratio to 0:36, at the cost of an unrealistically
high default rate of 6:25%: A more realistic but more challenging approach
19One potential question is how would nancing choice be a¤ected by a model with
persistent productivity shocks. Computing the derivative of eb   em at n = 0 and taking
the limit as  ! 0, it can be shown that if n and  are not too large and there is a xed cost
of issuing bonds, then bank nancing becomes less protable relative to bond nancing as
M increases.
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would be to model risk averse/consumption smoothing entrepreneurs as in
Zha(2001)[35].
To summarize, the main factor explaining higher bank nancing in Eu-
rope in our model is the higher cost of issuing market nancing in Europe.
The higher audit costs for a given loan size (higher ) do not seem to play
a large role in explaining European rms stronger preference for bank -
nancing. To the degree that bond underwriting costs have declined with the
introduction of the Euro, our model predicts increased reliance on market
nancing in Europe. One should note though, that while the introduction of
the Euro has lowered international bond issue costs, it is not clear that it had
a similar e¤ect on the costs of issuing commercial paper (which is a better
description of the short term market debt in the model). If di¤erences in
the cost of issuing commercial papers persist, bank nancing should remain
more popular in Europe in the future.
Finally, we compare the model with bank versus market debt choice
to the standard Carlstrom and Fuerst[6] model with only one intermedi-
ary type(table 4). This is a special case of the benchmark model with
b = m = 0:15 and  = 0: The other parameter values are the same. We
compare this model to our preferred calibration for the US with two types of
nancial intermediaries. The di¤erences in the prediction of the two models
for aggregate output and consumption are practically indistinguishable. Out-
put and total consumption are higher by about 0:11% in the model with bank
and market debt. Worker consumption is slightly higher than in the Carl-
strom and Fuerst model, while entrepreneur consumption is slightly lower.
In the context of this model, allowing for two types of nancing does not
seem to matter very much for predicting aggregate quantities. An economist
could have done just as well in predicting aggregate output and consumption
in this economy by assuming a single type of intermediary with audit costs
being an average of bank and bond audit costs. This provides some evidence
that, at least for some purposes, the usual practice of modeling a single type
of nancial intermediary may provide a good approximation as long as the
lending technology of that nancial intermediary is appropriately calibrated.
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4 Conclusion
We have examined the ability of a simple extension of the standard costly
state verication model of nancing, based on the idea of banks as better
monitors, to account for rmschoice between bank and market debt. The
model successfuly captures the tendency of larger rms to use more mar-
ket debt. The intuition for this result is that nancial distress is a smaller
problem for these rms, and this makes the advantages o¤ered by banks in
dealing with default less valuable. In order to capture the higher use of bank
nancing in Europe relative to the US we depart from the benchmark model
by assuming higher xed costs of issuing market debt in Europe. The xed
cost model can generate a realistic bank to market nancing ratio in Europe.
There are several extensions of this paper that should be explored in
future research. First, we have only examined the steady state behaviour of
the model. Once we allow for aggregate shocks, we can study how nancing
choices change over the business cycle. Many authors(see for example Oliner
and Rudebusch , and Cantillo andWright[26][5]) have argued that the impact
of di¤erent nancing types on business cycle dynamics depends on the degree
to which rms switch from one mode of nancing to another in reaction to
aggregate shocks. Beyond the usual productivity and demand shocks, an
interesting type of aggregate shock that may be worthwhile to investigate
within this model is a shock to the cost of monitoring b: At the end of section
2 we discussed the possibility of explaining the switch to more market based
nancing in the US as a decline in b in recent decades. Such an explanation
seems plausible. At the same time, it is sometimes argued that the switch
away from standard bank based loans in recent years has been excessive and
may have even contributed to the current nancial problems in the US. One
way to formalize such a story in this model is to model a news shock to b;
where agents in the economy overestimate the future declines in b:
Another interesting extension is to endogenize part of the ex-ante cost
of bank nancing  ; by introducing bank capital e¤ects. Reduced form em-
pirical research has found signicant e¤ects of the strength of the banks
balance-sheet on interest rates and lending[27][28][22]. An extension of this
model with bank capital would allow investigation of these e¤ects in a more
structural framework.This could be done in our model by limiting the abil-
ity of the bank to diversify part of the rmsrisk across its loan portfolio.
For example, we could introduce an industry level shock in an environment
where the bank must specialize in a specic industry. In this case, the rate
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of return on bank deposits is no longer certain. Assuming that the realized
return on the banks loan portfolio is freely observable only to the banker,
the depositors will have to audit the bank in case of low returns, just as the
bank has to audit the entrepreneur when output is low. The nancial friction
between banks and depositors makes bank capital(the bankers net worth)
valuable in this environment, just as the entrepreneurs net worth reduces
frictions in the current model.
Finally, while we focus on bank and market nancing in developped
economies, in principle the framework that we present can be used to study
any situation in which the nancing options available to rms di¤er by the
degree of monitoring. For example, we could also study the introduction
of various intermediate forms of nancing such as market debt backed by
bank repayment guarantees to investors. Or we could examine the choice
of farmers and entrepreneurs in a developing country between local lenders
with better information on borrowers and outside nancial intermediaries
(for example foreign banks) that with a more e¢ cient lending infrastructure
but less access to information on local borrowers.
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Table 1,
Benchmark model, US
 Pr(default) bankcostratio btomf#rms btomoans Debt/Equity Pr(extn)
0.01 0.026 0.045 0.248 0.21 0.069 0.403
0.005 0.029 0.04 0.372 0.353 0.0697 0.401
0.0025 0.029 0.027 0.619 0.671 0.07 0.399
 corr(i=a,n) corr(i=b,n) Y K
0.01 0.592 -0.543 2.631 26.314
0.005 0.591 -0.639 2.633 26.336
0.0025 0.589 -0.754 2.634 26.347
Bankcostratio is  +
M
R
1bx

jdFR
1b(xj nj)dF : btomf#rms is the ratio of the number
of rms choosing bank to those choosing market debt.
btomoans is the ratio of bank loans to market loans. Debt/Equity is the
aggregate debt to equity ratio.
Table 2,
Europe, benchmark calibration
 Pr(default) bankcostratio btomf#rms btomoans Debt/Equity Pr(extn)
0.01 0.0263 0.052 0.247 0.188 0.067 0.404
0.005 0.0288 0.0481 0.386 0.337 0.068 0.404
0.0025 0.0288 0.03 0.643 0.656 0.068 0.403
0.0005 0.0288 0.021 1.221 1.624 0.069 0.403
 corr(i=a,n) corr(i=b,n) Y K
0.01 0.592 -0.539 2.629 26.286
0.005 0.593 -0.644 2.63 26.301
0.0025 0.592 -0.759 2.631 26.312
0.0005 0.592 -0.871 2.632 26.327
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Table 3
Fixed bond issue cost in Europe ( = 0:0025)
Cm E(
1mCm
x n ) Pr(default) bankcostratio btomf#rms btomoans Debt/Equity
0.0025 0.174% 0.0288 0.022 2.602 1.855 0.068
0.003 0.199% 0.0288 0.019 4.466 3.138 0.068
0.0035 0.224% 0.0288 0.0178 7.81 5.544 0.068
Cm Pr(extn) corr(i=a,n) corr(i=b,n) Y K
0.0025 0.396 0.586 -0.196 2.6307 26.302
0.003 0.396 0.587 -0.122 2.6309 26.303
0.0035 0.396 0.586 -0.069 2.6306 26.299
Table 4,
Model with only 1 nancial intermediary type.
US calibration uses =0.25%, b=0.121,m=0.171
Single nancial intermediary model uses =0.15,=0
Y K Ch Ce
1FI 2.631 26.315 1.772 0.325
2FIs,US 2.634 26.347 1.775 0.326
1FI/2FIs 1.001 1.001 1.002 0.998
Appendix A:
Su¢ cient conditions for x  n > 0 (no rationing):
Consider rst the case when Cm = 0: Dene the relative prot between
external nancing and autarky as a function of x as (x)  e(x)  ea(n):
We will show that 0(n) > 0 when n <

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
: Therefore, by
continuity and the mean value theorem, for small enough " = x   n > 0
,(n+ ") (n) = (n+ ") > 0: Taking on some positive loan must lead to
higher prots than those available with just x = n. To establish this result,
we go through the following steps:
1)m0(!) > 0: Otherwise, since f 0(!) < 0;for a given x one could always
raise ! and raise ewhile satisfying the lenders break-even constraint
2) m(!)y = R(x   n): Otherwise, by 1) and f 0 (!) < 0 we could reduce
! and tighten the lenders break even constraint without violating it, while
increasing e for any given x:
3)x = 0 is never optimal. If x = n = 0, then lim
x!0
(1 )Mx 1 R =1:
This implies that we can always guarantee a positive loan surplus by picking
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a small x0 > 0 = n: Continuity allows us to nd a nite ! > 0 such that
m(!)Mx0  x0 and e = f(!)Mx0 > 0: So x = n = 0 can never be optimal.
4) x   n = 0 if and only if ! = 0. The only if comes from realizing
that f(!) = 1 m (!)   (!), and that 2) and 3) require that m(!) = 0:
This can be achieved without any monitoring by setting ! = 0: For any
given x; picking any other ! > 0 such that m(!) = 0 (if it exists) would
generate positive expected monitoring costs. Therefore ! = 0 is optimal.
For the if, setting ! = 0 when x   n > 0 would mean that the borrower
could make expected repayments arbitrarily small while evading all auditing
by always reporting that ! = " > 0 whenver !  " for some small " such
that "Mx < R(x  n): But this violates the lenders break-even constraint.
Since f(0) = 1, e(n) = ea and (n) = 0:
5) n = n. Therefore (n) = 0: See the proof of lemma 1b) to see that this
is optimal when x  n > 0: When x  n = 0, e = M n + n  n = ea:Since
xa = n whenever n  x^; it is also optimal for the nancial intermediary to
set n = n:
6)Dene (x)  e   ea = f(!(x))Mx  Mn; where !(x) is implicitly
dened by the break even constraintm(!)Mx = R(x n) (the function!(x)
is well dened since m0(!) > 0): Using the break-even constraint to nd
d!
dx
; 0(x) = f 0(!)d!
dx
Mx + f(!)Mx 1 =   [1  (!)] R m(!)Mx 1
m0(!) +
f(!)Mx 1 .Evaluating this at n; 0(n) = Mn 1   R
1 (0) > 0 i¤ n <
M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
: Note that if (0) = 0 and R = 1 then the right hand side
of this inequality is the rst best level of output with no nancial frictions x^:
In this case, the condition holds for any n < x^ by the concavity of Mx 1
and the rst order condition dening x^:
Therefore, for any n <

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
by the mean value theorem there
exists an " > 0 such that (n+ ") (n) = (n+ ") > 0: This implies that
x  n = x  n = 0 cannot be optimal when there are no xed costs.
Furthermore, note that

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
is decreasing in both  and  :
As a consequence for any value of n for which x  n > 0 with a given  and
; x  n > 0 still holds for lower values of  and :
When Cm > 0; 0(n) > 0 continues to hold if Cm is low enough. By the
mean value theorem, we can then once again nd x = n + " > n such that
(n+ ") (n) > 0:
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Proof of lemma 1:
1a) First note that f 0(!) =  [1   (!)] < 0 for any nite !:From the
f.o.c for !;we see that this requires that  > 0 and m0(!) > 0:
1b) If n = 0; we have  + lR = 1: Since R  1;  > 1 is su¢ cient
for  = 0: If 0 < n < n; the f.o.c for n implies that  > 0 is equivalent
to lR   1 > 0:Since R  1, a su¢ cient condition for this is again that
 > 1: By (1a) and the f.o.c for !;  =   f 0(!)
m0(!) . Note that f(!) +m(!) =
1   (!); implying that f 0(!) + m0(!) =  (!) < 0: Since m0(!) > 0;
this is equivalent to  =   f 0(!)
m0(!) > 1:
1c) Using the MEP result and the lender rationality constraint, for any
nancial intermediary e = f(!)Mx = [1 (!)]Mx R(x n) C,
where starred variables indicate optimal choices: By the MEP, when the
entrepreneur uses external nancing x  n: If the rst best level with no
nancial frictions xnofrictions  n, then Mx   (xnofrictions   n)  Mx  
(x   n)  [1  (!)]Mx  R(x   n)  C.
i.e, whenever external nancing may be optimal(x  n), internal nanc-
ing of xa = xnofrictions is preferred.
1d)0(!) = m
00(!)f 0(!) f 00(!)m0(!)
m0(!)2 =
[0(!)(1 (!))+(!)2]
m0(!)2 : The denomina-
tor is clearly positive. The numerator is positive whenever d
d!

(!)
1 (!)

=
0(!)(1 (!))+(!)2
[1 (!)]2 > 0, which is assumption 1. Therefore, 
0(!) > 0:
e) The proof technique is from Covas and Den Haan[9]. From the rst
order conditions, Mx 1i
f(!i)+im(!i)
i
= Ri: Suppose Cm falls. Under as-
sumption 1, !  0 =) f(!i)+im(!i)
i
 0 =) Mx 1i  0 =) x  0:
!  0 and x  0 imply that e  0; but this contradicts de
dC
<
0:Therefore, d!
dC
> 0: The proof that d!
dn
< 0 follows the same argument,
except that now d!
dn
> 0 leads to a contradiction.
f) We will start by showing that dx
d
< 0: This will imply that d!
d
< 0: From
the rst order condition Mx 1i
f(!i)+im(!i)
i
= 1 +  ;  > 0 and x  0
imply that f(!i)+im(!i)
i
> 0 and ! < 0: But this contradicts d
e
d
< 0:
Therefore dx
d
< 0: When Cm = 0; substituting the nancial intermediarys
break-even constraint into the rst order condition for x; we get (1  n
x
)( f
m
+
1) = 1. Since dx
d
< 0; > 0 implies that (1  n
x
) < 0 and ( f
m
+ 1) > 0.
Since f
m
is decreasing in !; ! < 0 when  increases. By continuity, the
result continues to hold if Cm is close to 0:
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Proof of lemma 4:
d
d
= @
@
+0(!)d!
d
: @
@
= (!)1 (!)
m0(!)2 > 0: By our assumption that lim!0
! <
1 and lim
!0
(!) > 0 ; the limit of the numerator as  ! 0 is positive.
lim
!0
m0(!) > 0 implies that the limit of the denominator is also positive as
 ! 0 (note that since m0(!) > 0 for any  > 0; lim
!0
m0(!)  0: The only
assumption is that the inequality is strict.). Therefore lim
!0
@
@
> 0: Since
0(!) =
[0(!)(1 (!))+(!)2]
m0(!)2 > 0 whenever  > 0; lim!0
0(!)  0: Moreover, it
is clear from examining the expression for 0(!) that its limit is bounded.
Totally di¤erentiating the rst order conditions with respect to , we get d!
d
=
 
(!)(!)
m0(!)  
(!)2
f(!)+(!)m(!)

(!)m(!)
m0(!)  (!)

0(!) f(!)
f(!)+(!)m(!)
+ 1 

(!)2
f(!)
m0(!)
   
(!)2
f(!)
(!)

1 
0(!) f(!)
f(!)+(!)m(!)
+
(!)2
f(!)
m0(!)
  A() 
B(): lim
!0
A() = 0 and lim
!0
B()  0: Therefore lim
!0
d!
d
 0: Together with
our results for the limits of @
@
and 0(!); this implies that lim
!0
d
d
> 0. But
then there must be a  > 0 such that d
d
> 0 still holds when  < :
Proof of lemma 6:
Suppose  = n = 0; and consider the (suboptimal) pseudo-bond contract
where the xed cost is paid even when x = n = 0. The lenders break even
constraint is now m(!)y  Cm: Note that now y is xed and therefore the
optimal x = 0: The optimal contract with external nancing contract must
have m0(!) > 0 and m(!m)y = Cm; otherwise we could increase !m and
improve the borrowers expected prots without violating the lenders break-
even constraint. Since m(0) = 0 and Cm > 0; !m > 0: The right continuity
of !m at  = 0 then implies that lim
!0
!m > 0: Since
@m(!m;)
@
< 0, m0(!m) > 0
and y is xed, an increase in  implies an increase in !m : d!md > 0 when
 = 0: The right continuity in  of d!m
d
at  = n = 0 imply the existence of
a  > 0 such that d!m
d
> 0 whenever  < : Since for any n > 0 and  > 0
d!m
d
is a continuous function of n; we can nd a n > 0 such that d!m
d
> 0
and lim
!0
!m > 0 continue to hold whenever  < 
 and n < n:
Model Solution:
Partial Equilibrium:
We can solve the nancial contract recursively by rst solving a nonlinear
equation for ! and then nding x(!): We use the rst order conditions for
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x and ! to nd x(!) =
h
M(f(!)+lm(!))
lR
i1=(1 )
: We then replace x with this
equation in the lenders break even constraint and solve for !: We solve for
! using Brents algorithm, which is a renement of the standard bisection
algorithm.
As for the uniqueness of the the solution found by this method we have
the following result:
Proposition 7 0(!) > 0 and m0(!)  0 imply a unique solution(if it ex-
ists).
Proof. Were looking for F (!) = m(!)Mx   Rx + Rn   C = 0: It is
su¢ cient to prove the strict monotonicity of F (!). F 0(!) = Mxm0(!) +
x0(!)[Mm(!)x 1   R]. The rst term is positive or zero if m0(!)  0. As
for the second term, after substituting our expression for x(!) and simplifying
Mm(!)x 1   R = R( m(!)
f(!)+m(!)
  1) < 0. x0(!) =  RM
1  x
 
0
l(!)f(!)
(R)2
< 0 if
0(!) > 0: Therefore under our assumptions the second term is also positive
and F 0(!) > 0:
We know from lemma 1 that 0(!) > 0 i¤ the hazard rate h(!) satises
h0(!) > 0: For the lognormal distribution there exists a !0 such that the
lognormal distributions hazard rate is increasing for ! < !0 and is decreasing
for ! > !0: Therefore we can restrict our search for a solution to ! < !0:The
other condition is that m0(!)  0: This must be true at an optimum, but
need not hold for all !: However, once again restricting the search for a
solution to the region where h0(!) > 0 helps. m0(!) = (1   )(1   h)  0
i¤ 1   h  0: Since h0(!) > 0 there exists a unique !00 such that for any
! < !00; 1   h(!)  0 and 1   h(!) < 0 for any ! > !00: Therefore there
is a unique region [0;min(!00; !0)] on which the conditions of the proposition
are satised. This implies that if our candidate solution satises 0(!) > 0
and m0(!)  0; then we have found the optimal !:
General Equilibrium computation:
Our goal is to nd xed steady state values for capital stocks, prices, ag-
gregate consumption and an invariant distribution of entrepreneur net worth
levels. Since the workerseuler equation xes r = 1=   1 + ; solving the
GE model amounts to nding the labour market clearing wage w:
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As long as for at least some positive measure of entrepreneurs xj is lower
in the presence of auditing costs relative to the frictionless economy(implying
that labour demand is lower with nancial frictions), we can bound the equi-
librium wfrictions  wnofrictions. In fact, dene l(w) to be the labour demand
in the economy where there are no nancial frictions:We have l(w)  l(w)20:
Then, l(wnofrictions)   1  l(wnofrictions)   1 = 0:Furthermore, if l(w)   1 is
continuous; there exists a small enough " > 0 such that l(") > 1:We can then
guarantee that using ["; wnofrictions] as the starting interval the bisection algo-
rithm will converge to wfrictions. Absent switches between external nancing
types, rm and hence aggregate labour demands are continuous. The possi-
bility of switching nancing types makes showing continuity di¢ cult. Even
if the true l(w) function is continuous, we must approximate it with a nite
number N of entrepreneurs, and this approximation may be discontinous.
In practice nding a market clearing wage was never a problem. In all of
the model parametrisations tried the bisection algorithm did converge to a
solution according to the stopping criterion
zl =  1N PNt=1 ljt   1 < 10 4:
As for uniqueness, we know that for each entrepreneur labour supply is still
downward sloping in w in the economy with nancial frictions, as long as
the change in w does not make him switch between bank and bond nanc-
ing21. If there were no such switches, aggregate labour demand would be
clearly downward sloping in w, ensuring a unique equilibrium wfrictions. If
the entrepreneur switches between external nancing types, it is still clear
that an increase in the wage must reduce prots, but this may occur through
an increase in both x and !: In practice, partial equilibrium analysis for our
calibrations suggested that entrepreneur labour demand is still declining in
the wage despite the possibility of switching nancial contracts.
We start the algorithm with the initial interval [wlow; wnofrictions] for a
small wlow > 0: We iterate on the following:
1. Given the interval [wil ; w
i
h] and w
i =
wil+w
i
h
2
approximate the invariant
distribution of fnj; kjtg: To do this we simulate a long time series of obser-
20In our modelxjfrictions  xjno frictions whenever xjno frictions  n; since
f(!)Mxj=(1   Pr(sj < !j))Mjxj   R(xj   nj) is concave in x; holding ! constant.
In this case, by proposition 5 in Gale and Hellwig[16] and the concavity of the revenue
functionxjfrictions  xjno fricitons:ljfrictions  ljno fricitons from the experssion for labour
demand as a function of total expenditure.
21To see this it is su¢ cient to note that the labour demand function decreases in w as
long as x decreases in w: But raising w decreases M; which lowers x(see Covas and Den
Haan[?] for the argument that @x=@M > 0).
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vations for a single entrepreneur starting from an initial net worth of n0 and
discard a subset of the observations to reduce the impact of the initial n0:
This leaves a sample of N observations. Appealing to a law of large numbers
we then take the sampe averages of cejt, k
e
jt njt; ljt and kjt to approximate ag-
gregate entrepreneur consumption capital supply, net worth, labour demand
and capital demand.
2. Use the capital,output and consumption markets clearing conditions
and the estimates of aggregatey; ce and ke from the previous step to solve
for ch; c; kh:
3. If the labour excess demand function satises
zl =  1N PNt=1 ljt   1 <
"l stop. Otherwise, update the bisection interval and proceed to the next
iteration.
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